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  The prospective commercialization of GM traits leads to several strategic questions for 
agbiotechnology and seed firms.  Important issues addressed in this study include the method of 
trait commercialization by agbiotechnology firms and variety production decisions by seed firms.  
Specifically, agbiotechnology firms must decide whether to license their traits to seed firms, to 
purchase a seed firm, or to not license or release their traits.  These issues are highly strategic. 
The purpose of this study was to determine equilibrium strategies of agbiotechnology and seed 
firms regarding the prospective commercialization of two GM traits.  Two game theory models 
were developed to examine equilibrium strategies in two different scenarios.  In the first model, 
both agbiotechnology firms had commercialization strategies of licensing and not licensing.  In 
the second model, the first moving agbiotechnology firm was allowed to have a strategic option 
to purchase a seed firm as a commercialization strategy.  The second agbiotechnology firm 
remained with two strategies, licensing and not licensing.  These models were applied to the case 
of Roundup Ready® (RR) and fusarium resistant (FR) HRS wheat, although the general 
structure of the models could be used to analyze other crops and traits.  Studies on trait 
commercialization and stacking are lacking the public literature.  This study uses game theory 
models to develop likely situations that may occur regarding the prospective commercialization 
of GM traits.  
 
Keywords:  genetically modified grains, wheat  
  
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF TRAIT COMMERCIALIZATION  
IN GENETICLALY MODIFIED (GM) GRAINS:   
THE CASE OF GM WHEAT 
 





  Commercialization of genetically modified (GM) traits in grains and oilseeds began in 
1996.  The prospect and demand for stacked traits in varieties has led to important strategic 
questions for agbiotechnology and seed producing firms.  Agbiotechnology firms are confronted 
with how to commercially introduce a trait.  If two or more GM traits are commercialized for the 
same grain, seed firms face decisions of which traits to incorporate into their variety 
development portfolio and whether to stack two traits in one variety.   These decisions are highly 
strategic.  The agbiotechnology firm’s decision depends on expected actions of the seed firm and 
vice versa.  A related decision for an agbiotechnology firm is whether to commercialize its GM 
trait through a license to seed firms or to purchase a seed firm and release it through their own 
varieties.  These strategic questions are motivated by the fact that mergers and acquisitions have 
changed the structure of the seed industry which is evolving from “seeds” to “seeds and traits” 
(Fernandez-Cornejo, 2004). 
 
  The Roundup Ready® (RR) and fusarium resistant (FR) traits in wheat are the focus in 
this study, though other traits in wheat are at various stages of development.  Commercialization 
of GM traits in wheat is slow because of consumer, government, and environmental concerns.  
RR wheat was under review by the United States and Canadian governments but Monsanto made 
a highly strategic decision to defer further commercialization.  Reasons for the deferment include 
the decline in spring wheat acreage in the United States, a lack of widespread need for superior 
weed control in the wheat market, and the success of other varieties in Monsanto’s research 
portfolio (Monsanto, 2004).  Monsanto’s deferment does not indicate that Roundup Ready® 
wheat will never be commercialized, but more likely in stacked variety. 
 
  The purpose of this study is to analyze equilibrium strategies of agbiotechnology and 
seed firms when deciding amongst strategies of trait commercialization along with variety 
production decisions.  Specific objectives are to determine payoffs to agbiotechnology firms and 
analyzing the HRS wheat seed industry in North Dakota and the geographical adoption rates of 
RRW, GM FRW, stacked, and conventional varieties.  Using these parameters, we developed a 
game theory model of trait-stacking to evaluate equilibrium strategies of agbiotechnology and 
seed firms.  The model is applied to the case of HRS wheat, but could be generalized to other 
crops and traits.  Economic analysis of licensing and trait-stacking strategies is non-existent in 
public literature despite these being critical in industry analysis.  This paper contributes to the 
literature by providing a framework for modeling trait commercialization and trait-stacking 
strategies.  Although the analysis focuses on one crop and two traits, the game framework 
provides guidance for possible strategies as GM traits in wheat near commercialization and can 
be applied in other grains and traits.
                                                           
∗ Huso is research graduate assistant and Wilson is professor in the Department of Agribusiness and Applied 
Economics at North Dakota State University, Fargo.  
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Elements of the Problem and Background Information 
  In this section, we examine development in GM wheat, the role of intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) and licensing in agbiotechnology, and the strategic interactions of agbiotechnology 
and seed firms when engaging in trait commercialization. 
 
Trait Demand and the Status of GM Wheat 
  Adoption of GM traits depends on several key factors.  In some areas, the use of RR 
soybean and heat tolerant (HT) canola have cleaned up weeds in cropping systems, and thus 
reduced the need for a RR wheat variety.  Also, infestation levels of pests play an integral role in 
the demand for certain traits by farmers.  For example, two types of GM traits are currently 
available in corn, herbicide tolerant (HT) and insect resistant (IR).  If farmers in the Corn Belt 
have significant weed problems combined with low insect pressure, they prefer HT corn to 
remedy this problem.  If, on the other hand, the farmers have high insect pressure but few weed 
problems they are likely to prefer the IR variety.  Finally, if the farmers have both high weed 
pressure and susceptibility to the European corn borer, they would have demand both traits, 
which is available in a seed that contains stacked traits. 
 
  There are currently no GM wheat varieties commercially available.  However, several 
GM traits for wheat are currently being developed.  At the forefront in North America are the RR 
trait by Monsanto and the FHB resistant trait by Syngenta (Wilson et al., 2003).  With the 
prospective commercialization of these traits in wheat, farmers may be able to choose the trait 
which best suits their production needs.  Farmers will likely demand FHB resistant GM wheat if 
their region is highly susceptible to scab and RRW if their land has high weed pressure.  
However, forecasting farmer adoption of such traits poses a challenge for agbiotechnology and 
seed firms which in turn affects whether they should license, develop, and sell traits individually 
or as a stacked trait variety.   
 
  At the farmer level, the RR trait may have significant value.  During growth, the wheat 
plant is at competition with weeds for moisture, nutrients, and sunlight.  Chemicals are used to 
kill or stunt weeds and allow the wheat plant to compete and survive.  However, conventional 
chemicals are limited to specific weeds that a particular chemical can eliminate.  Also, 
combinations of hard-to-kill weeds may limit the producer to target certain weeds and allow 
others to remain.  These factors, combined with the possibility of multiple applications of 
chemicals, affect producers’ demand for the Roundup Ready® technology in wheat.   
 
  Another technology that may be highly sought after by farmers is the fusarium resistant 
trait in wheat.  Fusarium head blight is a fungus disease that can occur on all small grain crops, 
but is most commonly seen in North Dakota in spring wheat, durum, and barley (McMullen and 
Stack, 1999).  Certain conventional wheat varieties have been labeled “moderately resistant” to 
FHB, such as Alsen from North Dakota State University (Ransom and Sorenson, 2003).  
Currently, most producers use a fungicide (e.g., Folicur
® - Bayer) to reduce the susceptibility of 
the plant to the disease.  Fungicide is typically applied at the onset of flowering; however, the  
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window of application is small and for this reason is not 100% effective.  Besides yield 
reduction, FHB causes reduction in quality, which results in market price discounts.  This quality 
concern is shared by elevators, food processors, and consumers.  Fusarium resistant technology 
would eliminate uncertainty about fungicide application and also the quality concerns related to 
this disease. 
 
Intellectual Property Rights in Agbiotechnology 
  Property rights were established to promote incentives to invest in research of a new 
process or product.  Debates on the economics of property rights began in the mid-19
th century.  
Supporters of property rights shared the idea “that stressed that intellectual property rights are 
both ethical and fair, and that they encourage innovation and foster social goals” (Giddings and 
Schneider, 1999, p. 3).  Critics of intellectual property rights (IPRs) emphasize the high cost of 
protection, the hindrance of competition, and asserted that IPRs limited the diffusion of 
knowledge and new technology.  Demand for free trade of all goods by some and property rights 
by others continued through the 1800s.  By the early 1900s, most countries had some form of 
intellectual property rights (Giddings and Schneider, 1999). 
 
  Duration and scope determine the optimal intellectual property protection.  If an IPR 
were to exist for a short period of time, the innovator may not be able to recover their costs of 
research and development.  Giddings and Schneider (1999) indicate that, the optimal duration of 
a patent may be a function of the type of product or industry itself.  In the United States, patent 
length has increased from 17 years to 20 years from date of issue. 
 
  The scope of a patent is more loosely defined in that it encompasses fringe developments, 
improvements, and applications that become barriers to entry resulting in changes in the 
economic environment.  Previous studies surmise that the stronger the protection (or, broader the 
scope) of the patent, the weaker the competition and the greater the benefits to the innovator.  
The weaker the protection, the stronger the competition, and the innovator may not be able to 
recover research and development costs. 
 
  Once an innovator acquires an IPR, the invention may be commercialized in some way in 
order for the innovator to gain rents from the invention.  The firm can choose to produce the 
invention on its own or to license it for a licensing fee, or royalty.  Oster (1999) provides reasons 
for licensing: “Innovators may license innovations to rivals who are expected to be more 
efficient in the exploitation of that innovation due to the presence of complementary assets.  
Licensing may increase the speed with which the innovation enters the market” (p. 323). 
 
Trait Stacking 
  If traits are licensed to seed firms, a licensing agreement must be agreed upon by the 
agbiotechnology and seed firms.  Once licensed, the trait can then be incorporated into the seed 
firm’s variety portfolio.  If the seed firm enters licensing agreements to acquire two different 
traits and stacks them into one variety, the seed firm has engaged in vertical product  
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differentiation.  For example, adding the traits for herbicide tolerance and fusarium resistance to 
a wheat variety should be preferred by all producers to adding only one or neither of the traits 
into the same variety.  However, the farmer’s willingness-to-pay for the improved technology 
may prevent farmers from adopting it.  Traits are typically stacked when farmers’ willingness-to-
pay for the new technology is sufficient to warrant the stacked trait variety.   
 
  Typically, a stacked variety contains two traits.  For example, the four crops with 
commercial value in biotech varieties as of 2004 were corn, soybean, cotton, and canola (Runge 
and Ryan, 2003).  The two traits that have been commercialized for these crops are Bt, or insect 
resistant (IR), and herbicide-tolerant (HT).  In some varieties, these two traits are stacked.  Use 
of HT and insect resistant (IR) stacked traits in corn and cotton has increased since their 
commercialization in 2000.  Cotton varieties with stacked traits comprised 27% of total U.S. 
cotton acres in 2003.  Monsanto has recently announced the first offering of a 3-trait stacked 
variety.  This GM corn variety contains YieldGard
® (two traits to control corn borer and 
rootworm) as well as Roundup Ready
® Corn 2 (“YieldGard Plus,” 2004). 
 
Mechanisms of Licensing Agreements 
  Licensing agreements are used between agbiotechnology and seed firms to facilitate 
research and commercialization of GM traits.  A research agreement gives a seed firm the right 
to use a particular trait in its variety development portfolio.  Once a variety is ready to be 
commercialized, the seed firm enters a commercial licensing agreement with the 
agbiotechnology firm, through which the agbiotechnology firm receives royalties from the sale 
of their traits by the seed firm.  Because of the significant cost of agbiotechnology research and 
development, few large firms lead the industry in research and development of new traits.  
Licensing agreements between firms who own the traits and seed firms that sell to farmers via 
various seed market channels provide a mechanism that allows traits to reach producers. 
 
  The relationship between the agbiotechnology and seed firms allow the seed firm to view 
the portfolio of traits offered by the agbiotechnology firm and choose those that best fits its 
needs
1.  Seed firms choose traits and enter research agreements with agbiotechnology firms that 
give the right to incorporate that trait into their own research and development program.  This 
research agreement does not allow the seed firm to mass produce and sell seed commercially.  In 
order to commercialize a GM variety, the seed firm then enters a commercialization agreement 
with the agbiotechnology firm.  Typically, the commercialization agreement states that the 
agbiotechnology firm will receive a royalty for each unit (bag, acre, etc.) sold.  
  
  The North Dakota State University (NDSU) Research Foundation recently formed a 
commercial seed firm called Roughrider Genetics, which is a “trademarked brand name 
established solely for the marketing of licensed or proprietary varieties owned and managed by 
the NDSU Research Foundation” (Roughrider Genetics, n.d., para. 1).  Roughrider Genetics 
currently has two commercially available RR soybean varieties.  In the early 1990s, the NDSU 
Research Foundation entered a research agreement with Monsanto to use the RR trait in the 
research and development of RR soybean varieties.  This research agreement was renewed at 
least once, indicating that the NDSU Research Foundation must adhere to guidelines set by 
                                                           
1 Material in this section is taken from interviews with J. Schuler, D. Zetocha, and S. Joehl in March/April 2004.  
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Monsanto in order to continue using the trait in variety research.  Once NDSU had a variety 
ready for commercialization, Roughrider Genetics entered a commercialization agreement with 
Monsanto.  Through this commercialization agreement, Monsanto charges a royalty for each unit 
of the RR soybean sold.  In this case, the royalty is directly seen in the retail price of the seed, 
and Roughrider Genetics acts as a collector of the royalties for Monsanto. 
 
  Mechanisms involved in stacking traits vary.  Traits are licensed individually to seed 
firms, not as a stacked bundle.  If RR and Bt traits are stacked, the seed firm may purchase these 
traits from Monsanto.  If another HT trait (such as Liberty Link from Bayer) is stacked with the 
Bt trait, the seed firm would enter separate licensing agreements with the two agbiotechnology 
firms and pay royalties to each.  The amount of royalty demanded by the agbiotechnology firm 
depends on the use of the trait (individual or stacked), if the stacked traits are purchased from the 
same agbiotechnology firm, the performance of the product, and other factors.   
 
  Typically, the seed firm would select traits that best complement their varieties.  GM 
traits are incorporated into varieties that sell, or have a potential of performance for the seed 
firm.  Also, most seed firms have different GM varieties on hand to satisfy different needs of 
farmers.  It is not uncommon for a seed firm to have a portfolio that contains conventional HT, 
IR, and HT/IR stacked corn varieties.  Licensing agreements vary among agbiotechnology firms; 
the amount of royalties charged varies among products; and stacked traits may be treated 
differently than individual traits.   
 
  Agbiotechnology firms use a number of criteria in determining the royalty charged for a 
particular trait.  First, market research is used to determine the price elasticity of the trait.  If the 
price elasticity of demand for the trait is high, the agbiotechnology firm may use a margin 
strategy; whereas if the price elasticity is low, it may choose to use a share or volume strategy.  
Second, the impact of royalty pricing on the company’s portfolio of products is evaluated, since 
most agbiotechnology firms sell many other products such as pesticides.  The agbiotechnology 
firm must determine how the royalty affects sales of other products in the firm’s portfolio.  
Finally, concern is given to the prospective reaction of key stakeholders (e.g., American Soybean 
Association and National Corn Growers Association).  The royalty for a particular trait does not 
vary by hybrid or variety, but may vary by region.  Market research helps determine the farmer’s 
willingness-to-pay for traits in different regions
2. 
 
  Agbiotechnology firms use the above methods to determine the royalty for a particular 
trait.  It is up to the seed firm to determine if the value of a variety stacked with two separately 
owned traits is sufficient given that the price for the traits is additive.  In the case of stacked 
traits, the agbiotechnology firm can offer royalty rebates to the seed company if the price 
elasticity for the stacked trait favors a discounted stacked price.  When traits are from two 
separate tech providers and stacked in one variety by a seed firm, there are typically no 
agreements between the agbiotechnology firms.  Each agbiotechnology firm stills requires the 
royalty for their respective trait.   
 
 
                                                           
2 For example, producers in Louisiana spray their cotton acres more times for boll weevil than producers in 
Arkansas.  Therefore, Monsanto charges a higher royalty for BollGard
® cotton in Louisiana than in Arkansas.    
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Mergers and Acquisitions in Agbiotechnology 
  A major strategic decision confronting agbiotechnology firms is whether to license their 
traits or to commercialize them through their own (to be acquired) seed firm.  In fact, one of the 
major structural changes in these industries has been the multitude of mergers that have 
occurred.  Lemarie and Ramani (2003) describe the vertical relationship between seed and 
agbiotechnology firms and outline scenarios by which GM technology can be transferred from 
the innovator to the downstream firms.  The agbiotechnology firm can commercialize a trait by 
issuing an exclusive license to one downstream seed firm or by issuing a non-exclusive license to 
numerous downstream firms.  Agbiotechnology firms supply seed firms with grains of plants 
containing the GM trait.  The seed firm then crosses these grains with existing varieties to 
develop the new GM varieties.  Because of the much more rapid pace of trait development 
compared to plant breeding, the technology from agbiotechnology firms becomes increasingly 
used to create new varieties (Lemarie and Ramani, 2003).  Therefore, agbiotechnology firms are 
needed by seed firms.  Conversely, because the traits need to be transferred into high 
performance varieties in order to be sold, the success of agbiotechnology firms hinges on seed 
firms’ decisions.  For this reason, a wave of mergers and acquisitions occurred in the U.S. crop 
seed sector in the second half of the 1990s (Lemarie and Ramani, 2003).   
 
  Because of the presumed need to own a seed firm in order to provide an avenue of sale 
for trait innovations, agbiotechnology firms began purchasing seed firms at very high prices 
(Chataway and Tait, 2000).  Coinciding with the first GM traits developed, agbiotechnology 
firms purchased seed firms that were leaders in corn and soybean sales.  But, the acquisitions of 
seed firms did not stop agbiotechnology firms from further licensing their GM traits to 
independent seed firms (Lemarie and Ramani, 2003).  For example, Monsanto acquired Dekalb 
Genetics Corp., Cargill’s international seed business, and Plant Breeding International 
Cambridge Ltd., while still licensing their GM traits to independent seed firms such as Pioneer 
and Golden Harvest (Chataway and Tait, 2000; Lemarie and Ramani 2003). 
 
  Through mergers and acquisitions, DuPont and Monsanto have become leaders in the 
soybean and corn seed markets.  Kalaitzandonakes and Hayenga (2000) report that, in 1998 
Monsanto and DuPont/Pioneer Hi-Bred had market shares of 15% and 39%, respectively, of the 
U.S. seed corn market, and 24% and 17% of the soybean seed market.  In achieving such levels, 
DuPont purchased seed giant Pioneer Hi-Bred at a cost of $9.4 billion and Monsanto purchased 
Dekalb and Asgrow at an approximate cost of $2.54 billion (Kalaitzandonakes and Hayenga, 
2000; Fernandez-Cornejo, 2004).  In recent transactions, Monsanto acquired Channel Bio 
Corporation, which holds two Iowa seed companies.  Monsanto is attempting to increase its 
share of the multibillion-dollar corn industry, and may be developing another method for 
commercializing its GM corn traits (“Monsanto purchase,” 2004).  Also of interest in this study 
is that Syngenta and Fox Paine purchased Advanta BV (Syngenta, 2004).  Through this 
acquisition, Syngenta gained Advanta’s North American corn and soybean business which trades 
under the Garst brand name.  As a part of this transaction, Syngenta also acquired AgriPro 
Wheat, the largest private sector wheat breeding firm in North America.  This acquisition gives 




  Rausser, Scotchmer, and Simon (1999) conducted a survey of mergers and acquisitions in 
the crop seed sector and propose three possible motivations.  The mergers could have been 
motivated in order to exploit complementarities of assets, to internalize spillovers, or to 
circumvent the impossibility of issuing complete and contingent contracts.  Lemarie and Ramani 
(2003) focus on the first explanation.  They found that final form of vertical control 
accompanying the commercialization of GM seeds is greatly influenced by final market demand.  
When the substitutability between the GM and conventional seed is high, mergers are preferred.  
Generalization of the model developed by Lemarie and Ramani (2003) indicates that any 
demand enhancing innovation gives rise to an incentive for a merger. 
 
 
Game Theory – Essential Elements  
 
  In an industry with a few major players (such as agbiotechnology), actions of one player 
impact the market price and, ultimately, profits of each player.  Thus, players consider actions of 
other players in making strategic decisions.  The complexity of such interactions is illustrated by 
Besanko et al. (2004) in that, “…your rivals’ optimal choices will often depend on their 
expectations of what you intend to do, which, in turn, depend on their assessments of your 
assessments about them” (p. 36).  Game theory provides a method to analyze optimal decision 
making when all decision makers are presumed to be rational, and each player is attempting to 
anticipate the actions and reactions of its competitors.  In sequential move games, players make 
their strategy decisions sequentially; one firm plays first, another follows, and so on.  
  
  Order of play is important in that one player can impact or change the other player’s 
preferred strategy.  However, in order for an advantage to exist, there must be a credible 
commitment by the player with the advantage.  This means that the player with the advantage 
(e.g., first-mover advantage) must make a credible threat to alter its own payoffs in order to 
induce the second player to choose a strategy that is more desirable for the first player. 
 
  “Nature” is a player that accounts for random events or uncertainty.  When outcomes are 
uncertain, nature’s decision node incorporates the probability of each outcome, which allows the 
equilibrium strategies to be reached while considering uncertainty.  This type of game has a 
mixed strategy equilibrium.  Watson (2002) describes that “a mixed strategy for a player is the 
act of selecting a strategy according to a probability distribution” (p. 38).  More specifically, a 
mixed strategy means that the player may choose one strategy with probability, γ, and the other 
with probability, 1- γ.  In the context of the GM wheat trait commercialization game, the 
possibility of a mixed strategy exists because of the uncertainties related to farmer adoption and 
market acceptance.  The probabilities of adoption of each wheat variety are used to determine the 
expected value of the representative strategy.  Thus, a mixed strategy is realistic. 
 
 
Strategic Games for Commercializing GM Wheat Traits 
 
  Two models are developed to illustrate potential strategic issues.  Both models include a 
GM trait commercialization decision by each agbiotechnology firm and a variety release decision 
by the seed firm.  The first model is limited in that the only mode of GM trait introduction by 
either agbiotechnology firm is by licensing to the seed firm.  The second model is expanded to 
allow for agbiotechnology Firm A (with GM FRW) to purchase a wheat seed breeding firm.  The  
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two models are presented independently, with base case results, sensitivities, and conclusions 
being discussed for each. 
 
Solution Algorithm 
  Gambit is a type of game theory analytical software that can be used in code form or in 
graphical user interface (McKelvey, McLennan, and Turocy, 2004).  The 2004 version of 
Gambit provides graphical displays of the game structure, along with several algorithms with 
which the software can determine equilibrium strategies of the game.  Gambit was used in this 
study because of its ability to incorporate nature and display mixed strategy equilibriums.   
 
Methods and Data 
  This study focuses on North Dakota (ND), which is the largest producer of hard red 
spring (HRS) wheat in the United States (USDA NASS, 2004).  Variables include 
 
  πA =  total potential payoff to Firm A (GM FRW trait), 
  πB =  total potential payoff to Firm B (RRW trait + glyphosate herbicide), and 
  πS =  total potential payoff to ND HRS wheat seed firms (conventional variety). 
 
  Payoffs for Firm A are  () A L A p N ∗ = π , where N is the number of HRS acres planted in 
ND, and  () A L p  is the per acre tech fee for GM FRW.  Similarly for Firm B, 
() ( ) 1 p p N B L B + ∗ = π , where  () B L p  is the per acre tech fee for RRW and  1 p  is the $/lb of the 
complementary glyphosate herbicide (assuming an application rate of 1 lb/acre).  Payoffs for the 
seed firm were determined by  S S p N ∗ = π , where  S p  is the average price of HRS per acre.  
Payoffs are shown in Table 1.  Per acre prices for the GM FRW and RRW traits were taken from 
Huso and Wilson (2005), which estimates the optimum prices for each trait based on an input 
price equilibrium model and parameters reflecting those in North Dakota.  The average per acre 
HRS seed cost from 1990 to 1996 was taken from Fernandez-Cornejo (2004).  Average HRS 
acres in ND were from the National Agricultural Statistics Service (USDA NASS, 2004). 
 
  Adoption rates for each variety are important in determining equilibrium strategies but 
they are a source of uncertainty.  Adoption rates for each variety were determined based on 
geographical weed and fusarium head blight (FHB) infestations.  Two state-wide weed surveys 
in ND were conducted in 2000 by Zollinger, Ries, and Hammond (2003) to determine the 
population and distribution of weed species.  “Weed frequency” was defined as “the percentage 
of fields surveyed that contained the weed in one or more of the ten 0.25 m
2 sample quadrants” 
(Zollinger et al., 2003, p. 2) and was determined for each of the 53 counties.  Wild oats and 
buckwheat were used as problem weeds, meaning that between the two weeds, the higher 
frequency assumed the number of acres in that county that would potentially adopt the RRW 
variety.  FHB infestation data was taken from Nganje et al. (2001).  Yield loss due to FHB was 
reported for each crop reporting district (CRD) in ND.  These yield losses were assigned to each 
county within the CRD.  It was assumed that if a county had a yield loss due to FHB greater than 
zero, all HRS acres in that county would potentially adopt the GM FRW variety.  If a county was 
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Table 1.  Payoffs for Agbiotechnology Firms and Seed Firm 
 
N  () A L p   () B L p + 1 p   S p   Payoff 
πA  6.65 M  $12.35/acre     $82.13  M 
πB  6.65 M    $11.33/acre   $75.34  M 
πS  6.65 M      $9.54/acre $63.44  M 
Source:  Derived from Huso and Wilson (2005) 
 
 
a candidate for both RRW and GM FRW adoption, the lower of the two values was assumed to 
be the adoption level of stacked variety
3. 
 
  This method was applied to each county to determine RRW, GM FRW, stacked, and 
conventional acres, and then summing over counties gave the total number of acres planted to 
each variety in ND.  Dividing by total planted acres gave the geographical adoption rates of each 
variety.  Assumptions were made to limit the number of varieties available due to the possibility 
of GM traits not being licensed.  Derived adoption rates, based on weed and FHB infestation, are 
shown in Table 2. 
 
 











Conv Only  100%  NA  NA  NA 
 
Conv + RRW  50%  50%  NA  NA 
 
Conv + GM FRW  35%  NA  65%  NA 
 
Conv, RRW, GM FRW, Stacked  15%  20%  34%  31% 
 
 
Model I:  Entry via Licensing Only 
  In Model I, two agbiotechnology firms, Firm A and Firm B, are seeking to determine if 
they should license their GM traits to seed firms.  Firm A owns a GM FRW trait and Firm B 
owns a RRW trait.  Because of recent developments in the GM wheat industry (i.e., the 
deferment of RRW), Firm A moves first and decides whether to license the GM FRW trait to 
seed firms.  Firm B observes Firm A’s decision and decides whether to license the RRW trait to 
                                                           
3 As an example, in Cass County, wild oat frequency was 26%, and buckwheat frequency was 45%.  Average 
planted HRS wheat acres in Cass County was 325,000; so, 45% of planted acres or 146,900 acres would adopt 
RRW.  Average yield loss due to FHB was 5.16 bu/acre; therefore, all acres in Cass County would adopt GM FRW.  
Since there is an overlap of 146,900 acres, it is assumed that those acres would adopt a stacked variety while the 
remainder would adopt GM FRW (325,000-146,900=178,100) and no acres would be planted to a conventional 
variety.  
  10
seed firms.  Based on the decisions of the two agbiotechnology firms and the potential adoption 
rates of farmers, the seed firm then decides which variety(s) to produce. 
 
  Payoffs in the base case represent the potential payoff to the respective firm for the sale 
of its GM trait or seed.  The derived adoption rates used in the base case account for uncertainty 
in the firms achieving the total potential payoff (Table 2).  Thus, the adoption rates result in 
expected payoffs for certain strategies due to uncertainty.  If a conventional variety is released, 
only the seed firm would realize payoffs.  If a GM variety is released, the agbiotechnology firm 
would receive payoffs from the sale of its trait, while the seed firm would receive payoffs from 
the sale of the seed.  It is assumed that the value of the seed, in addition to the value of the GM 
trait, is constant across conventional and GM varieties. 
 
  Figure 1 illustrates the game tree.  Firm A decides whether to license.  Firm B makes a 
similar decision.  Depending on the licensing decisions of the agbiotechnology firms, the seed 
firm decides which varieties to release.  The final move is by farmers, who choose whether or 
not to adopt a particular variety.  The probabilities of adoption under the possible strategies are 
taken from Table 2.   
 
 Base  case  results.  The equilibrium consists of pure and mixed strategies for the 
agbiotechnology and seed firms, resulting in a mixed strategy sequential equilibrium 
(summarized in Table 3).  Interpretation of the mixed strategy sequential equilibrium is as 
follows:  Firm A’s equilibrium strategy is to license GM FRW to the seed firm with probability 
1.0, and Firm B’s equilibrium strategy is to license RRW with probability .96 and to not license 
with probability .04, etc.  The seed firm’s equilibrium strategy if Firm B licenses is to sell a 
stacked variety with probability .17 and sell a GM FRW variety with probability .83; and, if Firm 
B does not license, the seed firm’s equilibrium strategy is to sell a GM FRW variety with 
probability 1.0.  The mixed strategy sequential equilibrium is a direct result of the uncertainty in 
adoption of farmers based on geographic distribution of weeds and FHB.  GM FRW and stacked 
varieties are the only two produced by seed firms because of the high adoption rates, which are 
.34 and .31, respectively.  RR and conventional varieties have adoption rates of .20 and .15, 
respectively.  Seed firms receive identical payoffs regardless of the variety produced, so they will 
choose to produce the varieties with the highest adoption rates. 
 
  Several assumptions were made in the base case.  Adoption rates, tech fees, and the order 
of play were relaxed to examine impacts on equilibrium strategies.  Sensitivities were performed 
on these variables to determine if and how the equilibrium strategy changes depending on the 
values of these variables. 
 
 Adoption  rates.  Adoption rates reflect the portion of area adopting each technology 
solution.  These also are reflective of potential rates of market acceptance, which vary across 
importing and domestic markets.  Presumably, market acceptance would be reflected in farmer 
adoption rates in a mature market.  Adoption rates in the base case were determined by 
considering spatial distribution of weeds and FHB across North Dakota.  The base case assumed 
that the weed frequency percentage in a county represented the number of acres planted to RRW; 
and if a county experienced any level of yield loss due to FHB, all acres in the county would be 
planted to GM FRW.  The overlap of RRW and GM FRW acres was assumed to be planted to a 













































































Table 3.  Model Structure I:  Base Case Results 

















1.0  .96  .04      .83  .17 
 
 
Farmer adoption rates do not necessarily conform to spatial differences in pest pressure.  
They could also be affected by input and market prices, cost and benefits, and market 
acceptance.  To examine differences in adoption rates on the equilibrium firm strategies, the 
percentage of potential acres planted to a GM variety was varied from 0% to 100% of base case 
values (Table 4).  If adoption of all GM varieties was zero, the mixed strategy sequential 
equilibrium for Firm A is to license with probability .5 and not license with probability .5; under 
both possible strategies of Firm A, Firm B had similar mixed strategies in that it would license 
with probability .5 and not license with probability .5.  Under each possible combination of 
strategies of Firms A and B, the seed firm’s pure strategy is to sell a conventional variety. 
 
 
Table 4.  Percentage of Potential Adoption on Equilibrium Strategies 



















0 .5 .5 .5  .5  1.0       
20 .5 .5 .5  .5  1.0     
40 .5 .5 .5  .5  1.0     
60 .5 .5 .5  .5  1.0     
80 .5    .51  .49  .95   .05   
100 .5    .96  .04      .83  .17 
 
 
  As adoption rates increase (and converge toward our base case) due to an increase in 
percentage of potential acres treated, the mixed strategy sequential equilibrium does not change 
until the level of adoption reaches 80% of base case adoption.  The mixed strategy sequential 
equilibrium at 80% of base case adoption is for Firm A to license the GM FRW trait with 
probability 1.0; and Firm B would license with probability .51 and not license with probability 
.49.  If Firm B licenses, the seed firm would produce GM FRW with probability .05 and the 
conventional variety with probability .95.  If Firm B does not license, the seed firm would 
produce GM FRW with probability .95 and a conventional variety with probability .05.  The 
change in equilibrium strategies is because as adoption levels of stacked and GM FRW varieties 
increase, the expected payoffs for Firm A when licensing are greater than when not licensing.  
Similarly, expected payoffs for Firm B and the seed firm change as adoption levels of GM 
varieties increase.  Thus, as adoption levels increase, there is more incentive for agbiotechnology 
firms to license their GM traits.  Practically, the licensing costs of an agbiotechnology firm are 
small in comparison to the R&D costs for a particular trait.  Therefore, commercializing a trait  
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through licensing (as adoption levels increase) results in higher expected payoffs for an 
agbiotechnology firm than not licensing. 
 
  Technology fees and payoffs.  The base case used technology fees and input prices from 
an input price equilibrium model to determine payoffs for Firms A and B.  Base case technology 
fees were $12.35/acre and $5.09/acre for Firm A and B, respectively.  Firm B’s RRW requires a 
complementary glyphosate at a price of $6.24/acre (assuming application rate of 1 lb/acre) for a 
total cost of $11.33/acre for the RRW + glyphosate bundle.  Changing the costs of the GM traits 
changes the payoffs for the agbiotechnology firms and the equilibrium strategy (Table 5). 
 
 
Table 5.  Impacts of Technology Fees on Equilibrium Strategies 



















Sensitivity on Firm A’s per acre revenue (tech fee) 
8 1.0    .5  .5      1.0   
10  1.0  .95  .05     .88  .12 
12  1.0  .96  .04     .84  .16 
14  1.0  .97  .03     .8  .2 
16  1.0  .97  .03     .77  .23 
Sensitivity on Firm B’s per acre revenue (tech fee + glyphosate) 
8  1.0  .92  .08     .81  .19 
10  1.0  .95  .05     .83  .17 
12  1.0  .97  .03     .83  .17 
14  1.0  .98  .02     .84  .16 
16  1.0  .99  .01     .85  .15 
 
 
  At a cost of $8.00/acre for the GM FRW technology, the mixed strategy sequential 
equilibrium is for Firm A to license with probability 1.0, Firm B to license with probability .5 
and not license with probability .5, and the seed firm to produce and sell GM FRW with 
probability 1.0 (Figure 2).  At a cost of $10/acre for the GM FRW technology, the seed firm 
produces GM FRW with probability .88 and stacked with probability of .12.  This increase in the 
probability of stacked variety production results in Firm B having a probability of licensing its 
RRW technology of .95.  Firm A continues to have a pure strategy of licensing.  As the cost of 
the GM FRW technology increases from $10/acre to $16/acre, the probability of the seed firm 
selling a stacked variety increases from .12 to .23, and the probability of the seed firm selling the 
GM FRW variety decreases from .88 to .77.  The increase in the probability of the stacked 
variety increases the probability of Firm B to license its RRW technology, from .95 to .97.  This 
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Figure 2. Probabilities of licensing and variety production as cost of GM FRW increases. 
 
 
strategically examines the payoffs of Firm A and chooses to produce a mix of GM FRW and 
stacked varieties because of their high adoption rates and payoffs to all players.  Because of the 
production of stacked varieties, Firm B has a high probability of licensing its RRW technology. 
   
  As the cost of the RRW bundle increases from $8/acre to $16/acre, the probability of the 
seed firm producing a stacked variety decreases from .19 to .15, and the probability of the seed 
firm producing the GM FRW variety increases from .81 to .85.  Over the same range, Firm B 
increases the probability with which it licenses its RRW technology, from .92 to .99.  This 
increase in the probability of licensing is due to increased payoffs as the cost of the RRW 
technology increases.  Firm A has a pure strategy of licensing regardless of changes in Firm B’s 
payoffs. 
 
  Order of play.  The base case assumed that Firm A had the first play with GM FRW 
because of Monsanto’s announcement of deferring the commercialization of RRW until another 
agbiotechnology firm commercializes a GM wheat trait.  The order of play was changed so that 
Firm B moved first, followed by Firm A, to examine changes in equilibrium strategies if Firm B 
decides to undo its deferment of RRW (Figure 3).  The resulting mixed equilibrium strategy is as 
follows:  Firm B would license its RRW trait with probability .5 and not license with probability 
.5; Firm A’s pure strategy is to license regardless of Firm B’s move; and the seed firm will 
choose to produce the GM FRW variety no matter what Firm B’s strategy is.  The seed firm 
chooses to produce GM FRW if the trait is licensed because of the higher percentage of adoption 
of GM FRW (Table 2).  Firm A chooses to license its GM FRW technology.  Because of the 














































































  The results differ from the base case in that Firm B is indifferent between licensing and 
not licensing because it is not able to observe the move by Firm A.  The reason for Firm B’s 
indifference is the low adoption rate of RRW and the high adoption rate of GM FRW.  Because 
of the uncertainty of whether Firm B will license, the seed firm produces GM FRW with 
probability 1.0 because of higher expected payoffs. 
 
  Alternative equilibrium criteria.  Because of uncertainty in adoption rates, a mixed 
strategy equilibrium was expected, and “one sequential equilibrium” algorithm in Gambit was 
used to assess the mixed strategy sequential equilibrium.  A pure strategy sequential equilibrium 
is deterministic.  The “One Nash equilibrium” algorithm in Gambit analyzes pure strategy 
equilibriums.  Using the “One Nash equilibrium,” the pure strategy equilibrium is for Firm A to 
license, Firm B to license, and the seed firm to produce the GM FRW variety.  Using all other 
equilibrium solving algorithms in Gambit derives the same pure strategy equilibrium. 
 
 
Model II:  Purchasing a Seed Firm for Trait Commercialization 
 
  Agbiotechnology firms have used other modes of entry rather than only licensing.  Part of 
Monsanto’s commercialization strategy of GM corn and soybean was to purchase Dekalb 
Genetics Corp., Cargill’s international seed business, and Plant Breeding International 
Cambridge Ltd. and recently acquired Channel Bio Corporation.   This is not dissimilar from 
DuPont’s acquisition of Pioneer Hi-Bred as a means to create synergies in agbiotechnology.  Of 
interest in this study is Syngenta’s acquisition of AgriPro (the largest private sector wheat 
breeding firm in North America) through their purchase of Advanta BV which gives Syngenta 
strategic options for commercialization strategies for its GM corn, soybean, and, possibly, wheat 
traits (Syngenta, 2004). 
 
  Coinciding with the acquisition of seed firms, agbiotechnology firms also licensed their 
GM traits to independent seed firms and universities to complement the commercialization 
strategy.  This commercialization strategy was incorporated into the trait commercialization 
model.  Firm A can now release its GM trait through a license to an independent seed company 
or by purchasing a seed firm. 
 
  Data and assumptions.  Firm A’s payoffs are the same as those defined in Model I if it 
chooses to license or not license.  However, if it chooses to purchase a seed firm, its payoffs 
change.  Under this strategy, Firm A increases its payoffs by becoming a player in the seed 
industry, because it owns conventional varieties and benefits not only from the sale of its GM 
FRW trait, but also from the sale of any wheat variety.  Firm B’s payoffs do not change from the 
first model.  If Firm A purchases a seed firm, Firm B’s decision to license means that it licenses 
the RRW trait to all seed firms, but only Firm A’s seed firm will be able to produce a stacked 
variety.  Thus, if Firm A purchases a seed firm, it has a monopoly position with respect to the 
sale of GM FRW and stacked varieties.  It does not license its GM FRW technology to other 
seed firms when purchasing a seed firm.  The possibility of simultaneous strategies of purchasing   
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  Financial data were approximated to represent the prospective acquisition costs of a seed 
firm through conversations with seed industry representatives.  Total annual cost of operating a 
seed firm was assumed uniformly distributed between $400,000 and $500,000, and revenues 
were uniformly distributed between $1 and $1.5 million.  A private variety is typically priced $1-
$1.50/bushel higher than public varieties and, assuming that 15% of total HRS wheat acres 
planted were a privately bred variety, total revenue from the sale of private HRS wheat varieties 
was between $1 and $1.5 million.  Average total seed cost was $9.54/acre; however, much of this 
revenue covers production cost of bulk seed producers, while the private breeding firm receives 
the royalty as revenue.  Using these values and assuming a discount rate of 7%, the net present 
value of a seed firm was determined to be about $11.5 million.  Thus, the value to Firm A of a 
seed firm for the purposes of commercializing a GM HRS wheat trait was about $11.5 million, 
implying an opportunity cost of capital (evaluated at 10 years and 7%) of $1.6 million per year.  
Payoffs under the new strategy of Firm A are shown in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 6.  Payoffs to Agbiotechnology and Seed Firms (in millions of $) 
 Conventional  GM  FRW  RRW  Stacked 
πA  $7.90 $143.9 $61.8 $143.9 
πB     $75.3  $75.3 
πS  $63.4 $63.4 $63.4 $63.4 
 
 
  If a conventional variety were released, Firm A gains 15% of the HRS wheat seed 
revenue less the annual cost of owning and generating a seed firm.  The payoffs to the seed firm 
do not change because Firm A is now in the seed industry.  If a GM FRW variety were released, 
Firm A’s payoff includes the potential revenue from the technology fee along with the potential 
revenue from seed sales less the cost of purchasing a seed firm.  If Firm A purchases a seed firm, 
the only mode of commercialization of GM traits is through Firm A.  Thus, Firm A gains the 
potential revenue from seed sales if the variety is genetically GM modified. 
 
  The payoff to the seed firm remains constant because the size of the seed industry.  If a 
RRW variety were released, Firm A’s payoff reflects 15% of seed sales less the cost of 
purchasing the seed firm.  Firm B’s payoff is the total potential revenue from the technology fee 
plus the herbicide cost.  Again, the seed firm’s payoff is constant.  Finally, a stacked variety 
yields a payoff to Firm A that includes the total potential seed value and the technology fee less 
the cost of purchasing the seed firm.  The stacked variety also provides a payoff for Firm B that 
includes revenue from its technology fee plus the herbicide cost. 
 
  Base case results.  The base case of Model II encompasses Model I. and includes a third 
strategy for Firm A of purchasing a seed firm (Figure 4).  The mixed strategy sequential 
equilibrium is as follows (Table 7):  Firm A would purchase a seed firm with probability 1.0,  
                                                           
4 This representation has a limitation.  It may be of interest to allow Firm A to pursue three strategies inclusive of 
licensing (as in Model I), purchasing a seed firm (as in Model II), and/or to commercialize by both licensing and 
releasing through its own varieties.  However, we do not have data and information necessary to determine the share 
of seed sales by variety, inclusive of GM traits, and hence would be unable to derive firm payoffs.  For these 














































Figure 4.  Model II:  Branch of Game Tree allowing Firm A’s strategy to purchase a seed firm  
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Table 7.  Model II:  Base Case Results 



















1.0     .96  .04    .01  .7  .29 
 
 
Firm B would license its RRW trait with probability .96 and not license with probability .04.  If 
Firm B licenses its trait, Firm A would use its seed firm to produce GM FRW with probability .7  
and stacked RRW/GM FRW with probability .29.  The seed industry would produce a RRW 
variety with probability .01.  If Firm B does not license, Firm A would produce the GM FRW 
variety with probability 1.0. 
 
  The reason that Firm A chooses to purchase a seed firm rather than license its GM FRW 
technology is because of the payoffs resulting from owning a seed firm.  With this strategy, Firm 
A now gains payoffs from the sale the wheat seed, along with its GM FRW technology.  The 
combination of high adoption rates for GM FRW and stacked varieties, along with the low 
annual cost of owning a seed firm, also contribute to Firm A’s equilibrium strategy of GM trait 
introduction by purchasing the seed firm. 
 
  In Model I, Firm A chose to license its technology to other seed firms because its two 
strategies were to license or not license.  Including the third strategy of purchasing a seed firm 
gives Firm A more flexibility in its decision making.  In Model II, the cost of owning the seed 
firm is conducive for Firm A to choose this as its equilibrium strategy.  This difference illustrates 
that purchasing a seed firm may be more attractive than licensing a GM trait, given a low cost of 
owning the seed firm. 
 
  Because of the lack of historical data relating to trait-stacking and licensing of GM wheat 
varieties, data from the price impact model and surveys on weed and fusarium head blight 
infestations along with industry averages were used to develop a likely situation as represented in 
the base case.  However, this is highly stylistic and represents one of many possibilities.  
Therefore, sensitivities were conducted on the cost of purchasing a seed firm and adoption rates 
to illustrate different possible scenarios and the equilibrium strategies resulting from each. 
 
  Cost of owning and operating a seed firm.  The base case assumed that the annual 
opportunity cost of owning a seed firm dedicated to the production of wheat varieties was $1.6 
million per year.  Sensitivities were conducted on this value to evaluate changes in equilibrium 
strategies as the cost of owning a seed firm changes.  As the cost of the seed firm increases from 
$5 million to $30 million per year, Firm A’s equilibrium strategy moves from purchasing a seed 
firm to licensing its GM FRW technology to other seed firms (Figure 5).  At a cost of $15 
million per year, Firm A’s mixed strategy is to purchase a seed firm with probability .99 and 
license its technology with probability .01.  At a cost of $20 million per year, Firm A’s mixed 
strategy is to purchase a seed firm with probability .81 and license with probability .19: and at 
$25 million, Firm A’s mixed strategy is to purchase a seed firm with probability .07 and to 
license with probability 93%.  Firm A’s most probable strategy moves from purchasing a seed 
firm to licensing its technology between $20 million and $22.5 million.  At $22.5 million, Firm 
A’s mixed strategy is to purchase a seed firm with probability .39 and to license with probability 
.61  Because Firm B’s payoff does not change, Firm B’s mixed strategy, regardless of Firm A’s 
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Figure 5.  Change in Firm A’s entry strategy as the cost of purchasing a seed firm increases. 
 
 
  As the cost of the seed firm increases, the production decisions of the seed firms also 
change (Figure 6).  If Firm B does not license its RRW technology to Firm A, all seed firms 
(Firm A + other seed firms) continue to produce GM FRW with probability 1.0 as the cost of 
purchasing a seed firm increases.  If Firm B licenses its RRW technology to Firm A, the 
production mix of HRS varieties changes as the cost of the seed firm increases.  At a cost of $5 
million per year, Firm A’s seed firm will produce a GM FRW variety with probability .72, a 
stacked variety with probability .27, and a RRW variety with probability .01.  At a cost of $20 
million per year, Firm A’s seed firm will produce a GM FRW variety with probability .82 and a 
stacked variety with probability .18.  At a cost of $30 million per year, Firm A’s seed firm will 
produce a GM FRW variety with probability .84 and a stacked variety with probability .16.  The 
production mix of HRS wheat varieties changes because as the cost of purchasing a seed firm 
increases, Firm A chooses to produce more of the GM FRW, which has a greater adoption rate 
than RRW or a stacked variety. 
 
 Adoption  rates.  The equilibrium strategy for Firm A does not change as adoption rates 
change.  As the adoption rates of GM wheat varieties decrease, the seed firm moves to producing 
more conventional varieties.  Sensitivities were conducted on the percentage of total potential 
acres planted to GM varieties, ranging from 10% to 100%.  The results of this sensitivity were 
much like those in the first game.  At 10% of total potential acres, the mixed strategy sequential 
equilibrium was for Firm A to purchase the seed firm, then Firm B would license with 
probability .5 and not license with probability .5.  Regardless of the purchasing and licensing 
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  As the percentage of total potential GM acres increased to 80% and over, Firm B then 
found it preferable to license its technology because of the greater probability of RRW or stacked 
adoption.  Also, at these levels, the seed firms begin to produce GM FRW, stacked, and some 
RRW varieties.  Firm A, however, would not change its strategy of purchasing a seed firm.  If 
Firm A purchases as seed firm, it receives payoffs from selling each possible HRS wheat variety, 
including conventional.  If Firm A licenses, it only receives a payoff if its GM FRW trait is 
adopted in a single or stacked trait variety.  This, combined with the low base case annual cost of 
purchasing the seed firm, results in Firm A always finding it beneficial to purchase a seed firm 
rather than license its technology.  This result would change as the annual cost of a seed firm 




  The prospective commercialization of GM traits leads to several strategic questions for 
agbiotechnology and seed firms.  Important issues addressed in this study include the method of 
trait commercialization by agbiotechnology firms and variety production decisions by seed firms.  
Specifically, agbiotechnology firms must decide whether to license their traits to seed firms, to 
purchase a seed firm, or to not license or release their traits.  Historically, agbiotechnology firms 
have purchased seed firms at high cost as a commercialization strategy, as well as licensing traits 
to competing independent seed firms.  Depending on the traits available for production, seed 
firms must decide which varieties to produce and sell to farmers.  The decision of the seed firm 
is highly dependent on farmer adoption rates of the different varieties.  Likewise, the decision of 
the agbiotechnology firms depends on the production decision of the seed firms.  Thus, these 
issues are highly strategic in nature. 
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  The purpose of this study was to determine equilibrium strategies of agbiotechnology and 
seed firms regarding the prospective commercialization of two GM traits.  Two game theory 
models were developed to examine equilibrium strategies in two different scenarios.  In the first 
model, both agbiotechnology firms had commercialization strategies of licensing and not 
licensing.  Depending on which traits were licensed and adoption rates of varieties, seed firms 
made variety production decisions.  In the second model, the first moving agbiotechnology firm 
was allowed to have a strategic option to purchase a seed firm as a commercialization strategy.  
The second agbiotechnology firm remained with two strategies, licensing and not licensing.  
Again, the seed firm made variety production decisions after the decisions of the 
agbiotechnology firms.  These models were applied to the case of Roundup Ready® (RR) and 
fusarium resistant (FR) HRS wheat, although the general structure of the models could be used to 
analyze other crops and traits.  Studies on trait commercialization and stacking are lacking in the 
public literature.  This study uses game theory models to develop likely situations that may occur 
regarding the prospective commercialization of GM traits.   
 
  Results from the first model indicate that Firm A (with the GM FRW trait) would license 
with probability 1.0 and Firm B (with the RRW trait) would license with probability .96.  The 
seed firm’s equilibrium strategy is to sell a stacked (RR/FR) variety with probability .17 and a 
GM FRW variety with probability .83.  Adoption rates of the different varieties are important in 
that as the adoption of a particular variety increases, the seed firm will likely produce that 
variety.  This continues to the agbiotechnology firms because if the adoption of their trait 
increases, they will increase the likelihood of licensing.  Another interesting observation is that 
as the order of play in the game changes, the equilibrium strategies change.  The base case 
assumed that Firm A moved first, followed by Firm B.  The order of play was switched resulting 
in Firm B becoming indifferent between licensing and not licensing because of the low adoption 
rate for RRW and not knowing if Firm A would license GM FRW.   
 
  Results from the second model indicate that Firm A’s equilibrium strategy is to purchase 
a seed firm.  Owning a seed firm provides additional revenue to Firm A through seed sales.  In 
the base case, the cost of owning a seed firm was such that Firm A found this strategy to be 
optimal versus licensing its GM FRW trait.  However, as the cost of owning the seed firm 
increased, Firm A moved from a deterministic strategy of purchasing a seed firm to having a 
mixed strategy of owning a seed firm and licensing.  Specifically, between cost of $20 and $22.5 
million, Firm A became indifferent between purchasing a seed firm and licensing.  In each 
possible scenario of the second model, Firm B chose to license its RRW trait with probability 
.96. 
 
  This study provides several implications, both in the private and public sector.  First, 
knowledge of possible strategic interactions and potential equilibrium strategies gives guidance 
to agbiotechnology and seed firms when faced with such decisions.  Second, this study is applied 
to the case of HRS wheat and has empirical implications in that it illustrates equilibrium 
strategies of agbiotechnology and seed firms involved in the commercialization of RRW and GM 
FRW.  Finally, this study provides insight into determining if and when an agbiotechnology firm 
would have a commercialization strategy of purchasing a seed firm.  This does not only aid the 
agbiotechnology firm, but also public institutions that own seed varieties.  If an agbiotechnology 
firm does not license its trait, the other seed firms and public institutions would not be able to 
compete in the sale of that variety.   
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  The main limitation of this study is that it is forward-looking.  It examines the 
prospective commercialization of two GM traits in HRS wheat.  Whether these traits reach 
commercialization is yet to be determined.  Another limitation is the number of strategy 
combinations in the commercialization game.  Game theory is stylistic in that one game does not 
provide general inferences, and the results are highly dependent on the assumptions of payoffs, 
order of play, and the number of players.  However, this study provides a framework for future 
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